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I. Introduction
Only in recent times has the international economic community turned its
attention to the necessity of respecting human dignity in the pursuit of capitalistic
success. Measures like the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights have been upheld as standards to which all nations should aspire:
“Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from
fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as
his civil and political rights…Considering the obligation of States under
the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and freedoms…” (ICESCR Preamble, 1976)
This covenant reflects the intention that nations of the world have displayed
in upholding certain undisputable rights of the modern worker. Most members of
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have signed
and ratified this covenant; the notable exception is the lack of U.S. ratification. The
universal worker rights spelled out in the document are largely held as standardized
goals around the world. Developed countries are often the loudest voices for
increased worker rights, and have implemented economic regulation to enforce
them. A large part of the regulation carried out by state actors around the world are
designed to promote the very standards the United Nations has put forth. The OECD
nations attempt to fulfill their “obligation of States” with service industry regulation,
enforced through their respective governments. These nations would be quick to
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assert their intentions in upholding human dignity in economic practice, but are
their measures effective? Does more industry regulation actually translate into
better employment standards for the citizens of these nations?
The goal of my research is to evaluate possible correlations between the
amount of industry regulation implemented by OECD nations and their respective
compliance with the provisions of Article 7 of ICESCR. Using statistical surveys
supported by the OECD and the United Nations, I endeavor to find a link between
government oversight and an increased capacity to guarantee their citizens “the
right to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work” (ICESCR Article III).
In general, the OECD nations are leaders in international forums like the
United Nations, focusing on spreading policies and practices that uphold basic rights
for their citizens. My research will help to determine whether the regulatory policies
that OECD nations implement to keep their economic activity reputable are in fact
promoting the human rights they eagerly champion on the international stage.
Ultimately, I strive to answer the following research question: Are workers in OECD
countries actually enjoying the rights and freedoms their leaders cite as nonnegotiable when crafting economic regulation?
My work will be carried out with the following methods. I will use the
codified data provided by the OECD on relative levels of industry regulation for
member nations, and conduct a regression analysis using those statistics as an
independent measure of a country’s regulatory levels. To focus on the protections
guaranteed by Article 7 of ICESCR, I will employ five dependent variables that reveal
the extent to which citizens experience fair wages, healthy and safe working
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conditions, equal employment opportunities, and adequate rest and leisure. The
fair-wage dependent variable will be created from OECD statistics on average
annual wage comparison by country. The worker health and safety dependent
variable will be derived from OECD statistics on the percentage of out-of-pocket
health care expenditure by each nation. The equal opportunity in employment
dependent variable will be taken from OECD statistics, and separate analyses will be
conducted for male and female unemployment rates by country. Finally, OECD
statistics on average annual hours worked across nations will be used to ascertain
comparative rest and leisure opportunities across nations.
Ideally, my study will make a strong statement as to the correlation between
the extent of industry regulation and results manifested in the quality of life for
citizens of OECD nations. This research thesis will fit well into the framework of my
College Scholars Program major: International Dimensions of Corporate Litigation.
With this project, I will be able to explore comparative legal regulation of industry
across OECD nations and its respective effectiveness. I expect to gain a broader
perspective on the effect of legal policy on industry across nations, as well as its
impact on different citizenries. This thesis project will enrich my curriculum as I
apply my legal and economic coursework to conducting an in-depth analysis of a
significant international issue.
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II. Literature Review
Following World War II, the United States of America emerged as the
hegemonic leader in a new system of global economic order. Though America’s vast
economic and military strength left it veritably unrivaled in global dominance,
American policymakers and economic theorists were anxious to promote liberal
multilateralism in post-war order. In contrast, Britain was focused on generating full
employment and economic stability through imperial preference and bilateral trade.
Ikenberry (1992) examined the “watershed” agreement that emerged at Bretton
Woods, focusing on the compromise reached between American and British
policymakers, economists, and monetary experts. This compromise would
eventually create the system of norms that have governed international trade for
almost century. Additionally, this framework resulted in the creation of the OECD,
and still carries heavy influence over the policies that its members pursue.
According to Ruggie (1982), this embedded liberalism was designed to
promote a comparative advantage system on a multilateral scale in order to
minimize, simultaneously, adjustment costs to society and political vulnerabilities
that might result from national differences. Additionally, both John Maynard Keynes
and Harry Dexter White sought to forge a compromise that would protect economic
stability against divergences in economic development, interstate power relations,
and domestic state-society relations. The Americans and their British counterparts
eventually reached a compromise that incorporated overarching norms that would
forever change the international economy. Chwieroth (2012) cites multilateral
surveillance through international regimes like the World Bank and the
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International Monetary fund, along with the non-discrimination in trade policies, as
the most formal of these norms. Informal norms included respect for domestic
policy autonomy, an emergence of international public finance, and the emergence
of inequality institutionalized in the governing systems of international institutions.
Ruggie (1982) argued that, after the collapse of the gold standard in the early
1970’s, international economic regimes would continue to develop based on these
shared norms instead of through an international hegemon. In turn, the demise of
the dollar’s gold standard created a dilemma for the world’s leading powers.
Developed nations reserved their commitment to creating a stable system of
exchange that would not allow for the “beggar thy neighbor” policies that followed
the First World War. Floating exchange rates were implemented to allow
macroeconomic policy discretion to correct for instances of speculative, irrational
“herd” behavior. These incentives allowed liberalization of trade regimes to expand.
Ruggie used this development to justify his theory that embedded liberalism could
endure in an international policy regime based on shared norms across national
boundaries, even without a hegemon. Today, the dollar has remained a key
currency, more nations continue to commit to multilateralism, and currencies still
retain convertibility.
While the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
would not be created until 1961, the Organization of European Economic Order, its
predecessor, was created in 1947 to oversee the Marshall Plan (OECD 2012). The
formulation of such an institution represented one of the first nods to a collective
international economic interest. When the United States and Canada joined the
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conference in 1961, the institution increased its influence across continents to
streamline policy formation in an increasingly globalized world. In fact, one of the
first actions taken by the OECD nations, the Code of Liberalization of Capital
Movements and Code of Current Invisible Operations loosened up the flow of capital
in international markets and provided some basic ground rules for national open
market operations (OECD 2013).
Subsequently, two committees were formed by the organization in 1962: the
Trade Union Advisory Committee and the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee. TUAC is key to presenting the views of organized labor to policymakers
in the OECD; specifically, the committee works to provide a social dimension to the
economic analysis that takes place within the body. The committee currently
harbors more than 58 trade union centers, representing around 66 million workers
worldwide (OECD 2013). BIAC reaches out to OECD delegates to advocate for the
interests of the international business community through the work of 38 policy
groups. Over 2,100 business representatives work to advance the perspective of
industry in the negotiation process (OECD 2013). Furthermore, in 1962, John F.
Kennedy’s proposal for an OECD Development Center came to fruition. This center
brings OECD together to discuss issues of poverty reduction and social development
(OECD 2013). The OECD Observer magazine was even created to disseminate the
findings of OECD researchers and the progress reached by the body, to build bridges
between nations about economic matters.
Several fundamental international policy guides also originated in
committees of the OECD. One particularly interesting product of OECD cooperation
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has been the Frascati Manual, first published in 1963. This manual is the
culmination of a joint effort to guide the statistical methods and R&D presentations
of members of the OECD nations. It offers guidelines for the use and collection of
international trade and demographic information useful to the OECD in the creation
and implementation of new policies (OECD 2013). The OECD Economic Outlook was
first published in 1963. From creation, its economic outlooks were designed to
update world leaders and research institutes with predictions for future progress or
regression. Generally, these outlooks are presented in briefings, often delivered by
the OECD’s secretary general, and entail a macroeconomic focus for
recommendations (OECD 2013).
Beyond regulation of capital markets, the OECD has historically been
influential in recommending policies for agriculture and the environment, as well. In
1969, for example, international standards for trade in fruits and vegetables
involved in commerce were passed. Beyond addressing agricultural issues, the
OECD employs environment ministers who first met to discuss global climate
change issues in 1974 (OECD 2013). Through discussion and research, the OECD
developed the ‘polluter pays principle’ to account for unforeseen environmental
catastrophes such as oil spills. When major disasters strike, the council stated, the
actor responsible for the damage should fund the clean-up effort.
The United States and Britain have historically played major roles in this
cooperative body, and thus their ideologies have been strongly reflected in its
decision-making processes. In recent decades, the OECD has functioned as a forum
for 34 member nations to discuss economic issues and promote solutions.
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In particular, OECD nations have proclaimed that the goal of their cooperative
efforts serves “to foster prosperity and fight poverty.” Undoubtedly, these nations
have expressed their belief in both international and state regulations for advancing
this aim. The work of Conway and Nicoletti (2006) is among those that have
compared national regulation of the professional economies across nations. Conway
and Nicoletti’s contribution, as to the extent of service industry regulation in various
nations, provides a perfect springboard to ascertain which level of regulation most
adequately meets the aims of the international community—specifically in regard to
the furtherance of ICESCR.
Other researchers have used various methods to explore the extent and the
effectiveness of economic regulation across the professional sector, as well.
For instance, Iain Paterson, Marcel Fink, and Anthony Ogus (2003) have explored
liberal professional regulation and its impacts in the fifteen member nations of the
EU. They cite regulation, at least to some degree, as necessary for the normal
functioning of a market. Their reasoning concluded that regulation preserves
competition, more effectively directs the production of public goods, avoids the
negative externalities associated with low-quality services, and resolves
informational asymmetries between professionals and clients (Paterson et al., 18).
More specifically, they examined the legal, accounting, technical and pharmaceutical
industries for presence of product, professional conduct, and market entry
regulations. Their study found that even within the realm of the EU, regulation
across the professional services varied greatly. Their findings indicated that, in
general, strictly regulated professions generally had lower numbers of professionals.
9

However, the output of each individual professional was much higher. They thus
concluded that regulation can promote economic benefit, though often at the
expense of consumer welfare. Instead of focusing on economic benefits produced by
economic regulation, though, this project will examine the effects of each OECD
nation’s professional industry regulation on human welfare.
Galligan and Larking (2009), out of the University of Melbourne, suggest a
degree of hypocrisy in the way the OECD handles free trade and regulation of
economic practices, compared to their handling of human rights adjudication. The
authors use their inquiry to highlight the reluctance of the U.S., specifically, to
participate in covenants that involve international human rights—even while the
nation simultaneously promotes the decisions of the WTO. The article suggested
that this reluctance may stem from a U.S. desire to maintain its power status in the
realm of human rights (Galligan and Larking 2009, 10). Further, the authors
indicated that free trade has been established as critical to the interest of the U.S.,
while human economic and social rights are, in essence, circumstantially dependent
and less suitable for legal regulation. Instead of limiting a critique to the United
States, however, this project will attempt to question the human rights
improvements delivered by each OECD nation in their professional sectors.
In a similar critical examination of professional regulation, Seibert (2008)
analyzed the effectiveness of regulatory boards in promoting public welfare. This
analysis concluded that government regulatory agencies essentially had the
authority to act as a functioning monopoly over their respective fields. In short,
restrictions to entry and other methods used by these boards drive up the cost of
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services to consumers while simultaneously eliminating potential sources of rivalry
within an industry. Her work also suggested that competition and market forces
could prove much more effective in delivering benefits to consumers than those
imposed by regulation (Seibert 30). Further, she asserted that decreased regulation
would generate a greater level of competition and drive service prices lower.
Seibert (2008) is certainly not the only researcher to examine the effects of
economic regulation on the professional sector. Debate over professional regulation
has raged since the pioneering work of Friedman and Kuznets (1945), who
examined regulation of the medical and dental industries. Also, in an assessment of
the dental industry, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) explored the effects of licensing
restrictions. They concluded that licensing offered no gains to consumers in terms of
overall dental health, but did increase the cost of service. Kleiner and Krueger
(2008) later examined specifically the phenomenon of occupational licensing. Their
study indicated that licensing can have a similar effect on the professional sector as
a union, driving professional fees up by as much as fifteen percent. They also found
that, as of 2006, 29 percent of the labor market was under professional regulation.
Their study was limited to the United States, however, while my project will provide
commentary on this phenomenon on a broader geographic scale, and across more
industries.
In an examination centered on the outlook of human rights in Australia,
Mapulanga-Hulston and Harpur (2009) have asserted that the claim of indivisibility
in the realm of human rights has been reduced to mere rhetoric (MapulangaHulston and Harpur 49). They further claimed that the economic and social rights
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expressed in ICESCR are relatively neglected when compared with political rights. In
keeping with the enhancement of cultural rights, state ratification of a treaty such as
ICESCR signifies a commitment to comply with its aims domestically. State parties,
after all, are required to present reports updating compliance with ICESCR’s aims
directly to the United Nations. While sometimes treaty ratification can be the first
step in a positive direction, though, Hathaway (2002) has concluded that nations
commonly skirt their obligations to comply with the tenets of human rights treaties
that they have ratified. Mapulanga-Hulston and Harpur (2009) go on to cite the
example of Australia, which ratified ICESCR in 1975 but as of today still resists its
enforceability in domestic operations. The nation asserts that economic, social and
cultural rights are delegated to the people already through common law and other
acts of the domestic legislature. Even so, the article itself reiterates that all states
that are a party to ICESCR must attempt to deliver basic rights of housing, health
care, and sustenance for at risk populations with their domain. Amnesty
international, in fact, has called Australia’s compliance with these tenets into
question (Mapulanga-Hulston and Harpur 61). The authors further suggest that a
bill of rights for the Australian people might be the most effective means for
ensuring ICESCR compliance. Their study, though, did not generate a greater
understanding of the worldwide situation in regard to compliance with ICESCR,
which is one of the aims of this project.
Leader (2008) has already called into question the regulatory proceedings of
the OECD in human rights protection. His examination of human rights abuses in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has inspired calls for a more effective system of
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accountability than the “soft law” provisions of the OECD. In 2000, a UN Panel of
Experts launched an inquiry into the management of the Congo’s natural resources,
only to discover vast amounts of exploitation and corporate abuses. The panel
returned findings that corporations had violated even the comparably lax OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Corporations. However, the guidelines are only
voluntary suggestions that protect consumers, organizational transparency,
technology rights, and competition. Leader’s study has suggested that these
guidelines are a well-established starting point for creating a system of governing
principles that will be enforceable against the actions of multinational corporations.
With a focus on the struggle to achieve the Millennium Development Goals
and an attention on the goal of attaining substantive equalities worldwide, Carmona
(2009) produced a commentary on the conduct of the 159 states that have ratified
ICESCR. These states were obligated, under the provisions of Article 11, to create an
adequate standard of living for the peoples they govern. The author focused on the
duty of developed nations to “respect, protect, and fulfill” the guarantees of the
covenant (Carmona 9). Developing states were called upon to comply with the
covenant’s aims where possible and to identify and to report areas of need. While
states are legally obligated to comply with these standards, however, the UN is
bereft of an effective way in which to supervise their enforcement. The optional
protocol attached to ICESCR has yet to pass the General Assembly, but it would
supply a system by which nations could lodge human rights complaints.
Consequently, Carmona has called for the ratification of the optional protocol as an
effective means for the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to
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ensure state compliance with ICESCR provisions. This mechanism is seen as
essential in the eventual realization of economic rights.
The widely debated concept of globalization has been examined as to its
effects on the enforcement of economic rights. Payne (2009) has analyzed its
impacts on this branch of human rights, specifically on non-OECD member nations.
His conclusions indicated strongly that nations must be disaggregated in order to
delineate trends in the effects of globalization. The international economic system,
he concluded, has had little effect in reversing economic and social inequalities
(Payne 415). In fact, his findings demonstrated that foreign direct investment and
official direct investment do not significantly influence the respect of these rights,
and that portfolio investment actually hinders them. The work also concluded that
human rights protection is not often taken into account in investment decisionmaking processes of multinational corporations in foreign nations. It could be that a
shortage of international economic regulation is responsible for these issues.
In research specific to the United States, Scott (2009) examined the ongoing
failure of the nation to focus on fulfilling social and economic needs. In the context of
the economic catastrophe of 2008, she asserted that health care reform was utterly
insufficient in providing the protections needed for the nation’s citizens. Her
overview of the situation calls into question the continued reluctance of the U.S. to
ratify ICESCR, based on the requirements to provide housing, health care, and an
adequate standard of living (Scott 22). In fact, all major developed and
industrialized nations have ratified the treaty with the exception of the U.S. (While
Jimmy Carter signed the treaty in 1977, he did not submit it to the Senate). Drawing
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a stinging contrast, her missive questioned the inability of the U.S. to comply with
the provisions of ICESCR while at the same time fielding a defense-spending budget
that outstrips the rest of the world by far. She views the ratification of ICESCR as a
critical step in the journey to enforceable human rights protection. Herein, I assess
the relationship between such regulatory measures and their tangible impact on
day-to-day living conditions of individual citizens across OECD nations.

III. Method and Hypotheses
A. Independent Variable of Theoretical Interest
Thanks to the extensive work of Conway and Nicoletti (2006), the 34 nations
of the OECD have been comparatively scaled in their implementation of licensing,
price, and fee regulations across non-manufacturing sectors. Specific factors of
“state control, barriers to entry, involvement in business operations and, in some
cases, market structure” were codified and weighted (Conway and Nicoletti 2006).
The researchers considered their approach “objective” because it was not surveybased; instead officials from member nations and OECD experts scaled the relative
rules, regulations and market conditions and market conditions in each country. In
order to weight relative regulatory scores, “individual regulatory items were
aggregated into low-level indicators which were, in turn, aggregated into
intermediate-level indicators by industry” (Conway and Nicoletti 2006).
Information taken from regulatory officials was then compiled into an algorithm
and later aggregated into summary indicators across each nation. Since different
weights were given to different regulatory procedures like licensing requirement,
15

Conway and Nicoletti admit that there is a certain degree of discretion involved in
the weighting of these regulatory schemes. They argue, however, that the
transparency resulting from an objective appraisal by governmental and academic
officials rises to a level of merit useful in accumulating data otherwise difficult to
isolate.
Their system rated each OECD nation’s regulatory practices on a scale from
zero to six. A scaled score of six, for instance, would mean that a country had an
average score of six, indicating that it had the highest regulatory levels for its
professionals, pricing of their services, etc. This data was compiled across
accounting, architectural, engineering, and legal professions. Adjusted for levels of
enforcement, their study makes a substantial statement as to the comparative
stringency of each OECD nation’s regulatory regime. Their findings regarding the
overall regulation in each nation’s professional services sector for 2008 serve as the
independent variable for our analysis. These statistics are the starting point in
determining the effectiveness of different levels of professional regulation in
advancing the goals of ICESCR.

B. Dependent Variables
For the purposes of this study, five dependent variables will be used reveal
the extent to which citizens experience fair wages, healthy and safe working
conditions, equal employment opportunities, and adequate rest and leisure in their
respective nations. These criteria were derived from Article 7 of ICESCR. Each
dependent variable will yield a unique hypothesis.
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The fair-wage dependent variable is derived from OECD statistics on an
average annual wage per worker comparison by country. This variable was
specifically taken from data tables representing averages from the OECD National
Accounts. The figures are representative of every sector in each economy. Taken
from the fiscal year 2008, these figures are designed to be reliably constant timeseries and cross-country contrasts. The OECD holds that they were reported
consistently for each of the member nations. The estimates stem from a division of a
nation’s wages and salaries figure by an estimate of their total employed citizens.
The final product of the calculation estimates average annual wages per full-time
equivalent dependent employee. The numbers are reported in U.S. dollars adjusted
for purchasing power parity and exchange rates. Based on the perception of
industry regulation and increased wages as discussed above, it is likely that higher
regulation will lead to higher wages. Thus, Hypothesis #1 will read as follows: As the
scaled regulation score variable increases, the average annual wage for a given
country will increase as well.
The worker health and safety dependent variable will be derived from OECD
statistics on out-of-pocket health care expenditure of employees in each nation.
These figures were taken from an OECD study that partnered with Eurostat and the
World Health Organization Health Accounts. They estimate the percentage of total
health care costs that are paid out of pocket by private households. Because of the
availability of data, these numbers were taken from the year 2007. While this is a
departure from the 2008 figures used in the rest of the paper, this was necessary to
provide data for the majority of nations. With increased industry regulations, it
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seems most likely that workers will pay less out of pocket for their health care. This
is due both to the structure of nations that tend to have more regulated industry,
being more likely to offer social services. Thus, Hypothesis #2 will read as follows: As
the scaled regulation score variable increases, the employee out-of-pocket
healthcare expenditure for a given country’s workers will decrease.
The equal opportunity in employment dependent variable will be taken from
OECD statistics on male and female unemployment rates by country. They are taken
from the OECD’s statistics database on the labor force of each nation. For the
purposes of this study, the respective unemployment rates for both men and women
will be analyzed in regard to the extent of regulation in the economy and are
comparatively examined. This process is designed to ascertain the extent of equality
in employment based on gender, in each economy. This study submits that an
increased level of regulation within an industry will likely promote equal levels of
male and female unemployment, considering that greater regulation would involve
more equality measures. Thus, Hypothesis #3 will read as follows: As the scaled
regulation score variable increases, the measures of female and male
unemployment will be closer.
Finally, OECD statistics on average annual hours worked across nations will
be used to understand the differences in comparative rest and leisure opportunities
across nations. These data are presented in the total hours worked annually per
worker. This average was arrived at by the division of total hours worked in a given
year over the number of workers present in an economy. They are reliable as a
stepping-stone for comparison between working conditions in differing economies.
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These data are consistent with the figures on productivity also reported by the
OECD. It is expected that industries with greater regulation will have higher
averages for hours worked over the course of a year, given that there are more
restrictions to entry and services are often therefore in great demand. Hypothesis #4
will therefore read as follows: As the scaled regulation score variable increases, the
average hours worked annually by each worker will increase as well.

C. Control Variables
To better understand statistical significances arising from the collected data,
several control variables were added to the study. Given the overarching
importance of national economic strength in determining both the prevalence of
success of economic regulatory policies, the gross domestic product of member
nations was relevant to control. Countries were thus controlled based on their
annual gross domestic product for 2008. This data was taken from the OECD
Factbook, and measures the size of GDP in billions of US dollars, adjusted for
purchasing power parity. As the introduction of this analysis focused on the
importance of the guarantees made by the world’s nations in the ICESCR treaty, it is
useful to examine the importance placed on these principles by member nations
based on their ratification of the treaty itself. Ratification would therefore indicate a
desire to comply with the aims appointed in the treaty. Countries were thus also
codified based on whether their government had ratified ICESCR. The only included
nation that had not ratified was the United States. Statistics were also culled from
the OECD Factbook regarding population size, Gini coefficent, and labor productivity
19

for each nation. After those data were examined, a third control variable was added
to the study: the Gini coefficient. Given the importance of wealth inequality both in
the implementation and the effects of regulation, this factor was deemed
appropriate to include. Thus to enhance the analysis, the results were also
controlled on the basis of their Gini coefficients.

IV. Data and Analysis
This study aims to juxtapose each nation’s level of regulation against its
ability to promote the values that the majority of OECD nations have aspired to
under the United Nations ISCER provisions. By performing a linear regression with
the data, it will become transparent as to whether OECD economic regulation of the
professional sector helps to deliver concrete results that improve living standards.
For instance, it would be expected that if regulation were effective in bettering the
lives of a nation’s citizens, nations with higher regulatory scores would produce
higher scores in areas of worker compensation, leisure, etc.
To perform the regression analysis, data were pooled from their varying
locations on the OECD website into a consolidated table. Using STATA, the
independent variable regarding the extent of regulation within an economy was
fitted against each individual dependent variable. Similarly, regression models were
created with control variables for the aforementioned elements.
For the first analysis (see Table 1, Model 1), Average Earnings per Worker
was regressed on the regulation coefficient for each nation. That regression
produced a coefficient of 3,915.77. This indicates the positive relationship between
20

regulation and the average annual wage of workers. However, this coefficient does
not quite rise to the level of statistical significance (p= .200). This means that the
data do not indicate that the extent of regulation have a significant influence of the
average wage of a worker in a given nation’s economy.
In Model 1.2, Employee Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure was also regressed
on the regulation coefficient for each nation. A positive correlation was found
between out of pocket health expenditure and increased professional industry
regulation, with a coefficient of 2.89 (p=.1065). At this point, then, I find no support
for the hypothesis that increased industry regulation would produce decreased
employee out-of-pocket health expenditure. In fact, my findings would indicate that
health care expenditure actually increased with increases in regulation—although
this finding only borders statistical significance at the .10 level. This phenomenon is
perhaps explained by a link between increased costs to industry in complying with
regulations, which are then passed on to employees. Ultimately, additional research
is needed to further examine this occurrence.
Analysis of the effects of industry regulation on equal opportunity for women
and men in the workplace required a more complex analysis. Both the Male and
Female Unemployment Rates for each nation’s economy were regressed on their
respective regulation scaled scores. For female unemployment, the model yielded a
coefficient of -66.56. This indicates that female unemployment decreases with more
industry regulation. However, the p value is .6781, which means that the effect of
regulation on decreasing unemployment is not statistically significant. For the male
unemployment variable, the model yielded a coefficient of -72.96. This indicates that
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with increased regulation, male unemployment is reduced to an even greater degree
than female unemployment. However, male unemployment and professional
industry regulation are not statistically significant (p = .7282). Even so, while both
unemployment values fail to achieve statistical significance, an inference can be
drawn from the two models. Specifically, a comparison of the results from Model 1.3
and Model 1.4 fail to support the hypothesis that increased regulation would create
greater gender equality in employment.
In Model 1.5, the Average Annual Hours Worked per Worker variable was
regressed on the professional regulation level of each economy. A coefficient of
75.85 was generated, meaning that workers in more regulated economies generally
work more hours. This statistic generated a p value of .0934, meaning that the
correlation achieves weak statistical significance. Thus, the effect of professional
industry regulation on the amount of time workers spend at work is debatable, but
worthy of future consideration. Hypothesis #4 indicated that hours worked would
likely increase with increased regulation, and is not falsified by these findings.
However, it ultimately seems illogical that more regulation would lead to more
hours worked. One explanation could be that more regulation might place economic
restrictions on employers, and would in turn result in fewer employees entering the
workforce; thus, existing employees would be forced to work more hours.
While not every variable in the models achieved statistical significance, the
findings were nevertheless telling. The variables that showed the greatest statistical
significance were average hours worked and out-of-pocket health expenditures. It
can reasonably be assumed that greater government regulation of the professional
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service industry does play an important role in increasing the hours an employee
works and increases healthcare expenses paid by employees. Given that these p
values are on the higher side, though, these data indicate that professional industry
regulation is not playing an exceptionally significant role in helping nations meet
promises made in ICESCR and similar treaties. Rather, these findings seem to
indicate that greater economic regulation does not necessarily lead to improved
conditions for workers.
In order to better understand the true effects of professional industry
regulation on individual national economies, a series of control variables were used
to paint a clearer picture of economic reality. A discussion of the control variables
and their effects on the dataset follow.
Controlled Scenario Data and Analysis
To bolster the analysis from Table1, three control variables were used: gross
domestic product in billions of dollars, ratification ICESCR and the Gini coefficient.
These variables were introduced to create a new set of regression models (See Table
2). As stated previously, ICESCR refers to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights passed by the United Nations. Only the U.S. has not
ratified this treaty, but controlling for this fact altered the findings greatly. National
data were also controlled based on their respective Gini coefficients, which is a
measure of income inequality in each economy; the higher the Gini coefficient, the
greater income inequality is present within a nation. These three factors were used
to take a closer look at the effects of government regulation on economic well-being.
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In Model 2.1, the Average Annual Earnings per Worker variable was regressed
with the control variables added; the regression generated a coefficient for the
extent of industry regulation variable of 1,455. This correlation was positive, as it
was in the first regression, but is again statistically insignificant (p =.70). These
results would indicate that overall professional industry regulation is not likely to
have a significant impact upon raising average annual earnings per worker, even
less so when controlled for differences between nations. While it appears from our
analysis that worker earnings might be mildly positively correlated with increased
regulation, the statistics suggest that this notion is not statistically significant after
instituting appropriate controls.
In Model 2.2, Employee Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure, the results were
equally surprising. When adjusted for statistical differences across nations, the
analysis generated a coefficient of .099. The correlation was positive as in the first
analysis, but again, less so than before. The controlled p value, however, was .95,
which was significantly higher than the uncontrolled p value. This seems to indicate
that when outside factors are controlled for, economic regulation has an even
smaller impact on employee health expenditure. While the coefficient would still
imply that employee health expenditure increases with increased economic
regulation, the p value precludes reliance on this finding. It is interesting to note that
when the variable was controlled on the basis of GDP, p=.095. This means that GDP
weighs heavily as an influence on how much workers spend on health care.
Economic regulation, however, cannot be tightly linked to the extent of employee
spending on health care, because of a high p value.
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When controlled on the basis of GDP, ICESCR ratification, and Gini coefficient,
the Male Unemployment and Female Unemployment variables produced an
interesting set of findings (Model 2.3, 2.4). When male unemployment was
regressed with the controls, the coefficient for extent of industry regulation was
66.97. This output was significantly different from before, indicating a positive
relationship between regulation and unemployment instead of a negative one. Also
interesting, the p value was significantly reduced with the control variables included,
and fell at p=.158. This means that when control factors are considered, increases in
male unemployment could be related to the dependent variable; The p value,
however, is not strikingly low, so the impact of regulation at all is arguable; future
research may wish to re-analyze this relationship. It is interesting to note that GDP
was significantly linked to rates of male unemployment, with a controlled p value
of .000. Whether or not a country had ratified ICESCR also played into the extent of
male unemployment, generating a controlled p value of .03.
With respect to female unemployment, the coefficient for extent industry
regulation was 97.10 with the controls added (Model 2.4). This result indicated a
positive correlation between economic regulation and female unemployment. For
this analysis, p=.084, making it statistically significant; economic regulation, then,
seemed to increase female unemployment rates. While that p value is not highly
significant, it can reasonably be concluded that increased industry regulation does
increase female unemployment. The GDP control variable also had a significant
influence on these findings (p=.000).
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Overall, this study aimed to determine whether or not economic regulation
increased gender equality in the workforce. Given the output of Model 2.3 and
Model 2.4, though, it seems that industry regulation increases female
unemployment at a more rapid rate than male unemployment. It would be
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that industry regulation is definitely not
significantly increasing gender equality, and may in fact be decreasing gender
equality in the workplace. This finding is more reliable given the lower p values
generated by a controlled linear regression analysis.
In Model 2.5, the Annual Average Hours Worked per Worker was regressed on
the extent of industry regulation generating a coefficient of 59.95. This would
indicate that increased regulation increases the average hours worked annually by
each worker. The extent of this increase was reduced when controlled by various
factors that influence each nation’s economy. This finding bordered on the generally
accepted parameters of statistical significance (p=.136). This indicates that while not
concretely linked, there is still an important relationship between industry
regulation and annual average hours worked per worker. It can be safely stated,
then, that increased economic regulation does not reduce the amount of hours each
worker works. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, in regard to the annual
hours worked per worker, the control variable for Gini coefficient was statistically
significant, with a p value of .017. This seems to indicate that a country’s income
distribution is positively related to the hours worked by its employees.
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V. Conclusions
Given the results of the initial analysis and the controlled regression, the
most statistically significant result generated by the analysis centered on female
unemployment. The model succeeded in finding a link between increased economic
regulation and increased female unemployment. Reasons for this connection could
be wide ranging, and more studies will be needed in the future to determine the true
cause of this phenomenon. However, one possible reason for the increases in female
unemployment associated with increased industry regulation could be a connection
between economic regulation and the incentive of businesses to hire workers. It
could be possible that increased levels of regulation and requirement on private
enterprise create a disincentive for the entity to hire a greater number of employees.
Since women have been historically underrepresented in industries such as
engineering, medicine, and law, firms that are able to hire only a few workers may
be more inclined to hire males first. Thus, it seems elementary to assume that
additional requirements placed on workers, especially women who may be
trailblazers in certain industries, would be detrimental in achieving gainful
employment.
As to the broader results of this inquiry, results are varied, as p values
generated in the controlled analyses were equivocal on the matter of statistical
significance. The most significant connections between regulation and working
conditions in the uncontrolled analysis implied that health expenditure and hours
worked both increased as regulation increased. These findings were weakly
significant though, at p levels of approximately .10. On the whole, however, this
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analysis generates the conclusion that increased industry regulation is not closely
linked to many noticeable increases in ICESCR compliance.
These results are somewhat startling. OECD nations employ various forms of
industry regulation on their economies to improve general welfare. Even so, this
study, could find no link between increased levels of regulation and improvements
experienced by workers in areas of wages, health, equality, or leisure. In fact, the
most significant findings actually indicated that increased regulation had a negative
influence on the quality of life experienced by workers. Specifically, paying more out
of pocket for health care and working longer hours, or perhaps not working at all,
are the only phenomenon that seemed to bear a statistically significant link to
increased regulation on industry.
This is obviously an area that requires a great deal more research. If anything,
these results are most troubling. Global economic hardships are widespread and
divaricated. OECD nations claim to be the most advanced, most developed systems
in regulating economic activity. It appears, however, that the tools they claim to be
effective are instead ineffective, and perhaps even detrimental to the citizens they
serve. The requirement of ICESCR, with its basic human rights guarantees, is
certainly not an outrageous infringement on national government. It is, rather, a
useful guideline in forming goals for developed nations to achieve.
Based on the results of this analysis, it appears that OECD nations are not on
the right track to achieving these aims. The economic regulations they employ over
industry are simply not bettering the lives of their citizens. In some cases, excessive
regulation may in fact make the lives of individual citizens more challenging—
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perhaps by inadvertently increasing expenditure on health care, hours worked, and
unemployment. It thus appears that those countries with stricter regulations do not
deliver positive economic results. Future papers are needed in order to discuss the
reasons why regulation is not having a positive effect, and which types of regulation
are most effective.
In the end, these findings pose a very sobering question. If those nations that
have committed themselves to compliance with ICESCR have thus far been entirely
unsuccessful in bringing about its aims, what course should the nations of the world
take? Clearly, ICESCR ratification is not linked with better economic outcomes for
the world’s citizens. The United States has been universally condemned for refusing
to ratify the treaty, yet those nations that have are not achieving better results.
While ICESCR’s aims certainly seem noble, perhaps its weakness lies in a lack of
direction as to how nations pursue the achievement of their aims. The treaty seems
to exist as an idealized conception of society, without a specific plan of action for the
world’s nations and without proof that its aims are even attainable. This will
undoubtedly be an issue with which the United Nations will grapple over the course
of the next decade.
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Table 1: Impact of Regulation on Worker Quality of Life (OLS Regression)
Independent
Variables

Extent of Industry
Regulation

Constant

Model 1.1
Annual Average
Earnings per
Worker
Coeff

P

3,915.77
(2,965.62)

.20

.003***

Model 1.2
Employee out
of Pocket
Health
Expenditure
Coeff
P

Model 1.3
Male
Unemployment

Model 1.4
Female
Unemployment

Coeff

P

Coeff

P

2.89
(1.73)

-72.96
(208.02)

.73

-66.56
(158.82)

.68

.11

Model 1.5
Average
Annual Hours
Worked Per
Worker
Coeff
P
75.85*
(43.73)

.003***

.123

.100*

.000***

Number of
countries
R-squared

25

27

33

33

31

.071

.101

.004

.006

.094

F-ratio

1.74

2.80

.12

.18

3.01

Standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed test; *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01
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Table 2: Impact of Regulation on Worker Quality of Life
(OLS Regression with control variables)

Independent
Variables

Model 2.1
Annual Average
Earnings per
Worker

Model 2.2
Employee out
of Pocket
Health
Expenditure
Coeff
P

Model 2.3
Male
Unemployment

Model 2.4
Female
Unemployment

Model 2.5
Average Annual
Hours Worked
Per Worker

Coeff

P

Coeff

P

Coeff

P

Coeff

P

1455.85
(3627.984)

.70

.10
(1.57)

.95

66.97
(45.78)

.16

98.0*
(54.06)

.08

59.95
(38.64)

.14

GDP
(billions)

-.10
(2.49)

.97

-.002*
(.001)

.095

.44***
(.04)

.00

.34***
(.05)

.00

-.04
(.03)

.20

Ratified
ICESCR

966.38
(34794.43)

.98

-21.14
(16.46)

.22

1287.25
(552.71)

.03**

990.34
(652.76)

.14

-650.38
(466.56)

.18

Gini
Coefficient

50967.38
(45545.61)

.28

59.17
(37.09)

.13

851.21
(726.64)

.26

474.61
(858.17)

.59

1591.72**
(613.37)

.02

Constant
Number of
countries
R-squared
F-ratio

.775
18

.242
21

.009
26

.08
26

.001
26

.104
.38

.232
1.21

.971
174.37***

.934
73.68***

.328
2.56*

Extent of
Industry
Regulation

Standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed test; *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01
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Appendix: Data For Key Variables
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

GDP
Parliamentary? Ratified
(billion$)
ICER?
831.2
1
315.6
1
377.9
1
1300.2
1
0
256.9
1
202.2
1
1
190.8
1
2121.7
1
2909.7
1
324.7
1
198.1
1
11.8
1
184.4
1
1
1871.7
1
4358.3
1
1344.4
0
41.4
1
1545.3
0
675.1
1
116.4
1
280
1
659.2
1
247.3
1
119.7
1
1434.2
1
340.5
1
329.9
0
991.7
1
2186
1
14369.4
0
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0

Population Health
(thousands) Expenditures
21016
19.1
8333
16.3
10517
20.6
33095
15.5
10262
5461
5307
61840
82772
11218
10035
301
4250

13.6
14.6
22.2
20.4
7.2
12.8
25.1
16
29.5

58851
127568
48607
471
106683
16390
4188
4707
37927
10620
5393
44311
9159
7584
74767
61412
304228

16.4
37
13.4
6
14.3
16.1
25.9
28.2
27.4
14
21.6
17.2
30.7
13.6

Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

Male
Female
Avg.Hours Avg.Earnings IndustryReg Gini
Unempl. Unempl.
Worked
Per Worker
Index
Coeff.
243
234
1718
1.2
0.3
82
81
1631
45464
2.7
0.27
170
63
1568
35260
2.2
0.27
632
487
1727
38506
3.1
0.32
307
254
40341
2.4
103
127
1992
2.3
0.26
47
51
1570
17227
1.2
0.23
21
18
1969
41166
2.1
84
88
1704
1
0.26
1023
1044
1560
33489
2.1
0.28
1687
1451
1430
33802
2.9
0.27
148
230
2116
32047
2.8
0.34
174
155
1986
21693
3.1
0.29
3
2
1807
15766
1.8
84
43
1631
0.9
0.3
91
90
1943
44413
3.1
820
872
1807
3.2
0.34
1600
1050
1772
27099
1.5
0.34
506
267
2256
32872
2.3
5
6
1555
26353
3.5
0.26
921
663
1893
49260
1.8
0.51
132
128
1389
1.2
0.28
50
45
1746
38936
1.8
0.34
38
30
1423
1.7
0.26
599
612
1969
42565
2.7
0.32
195
233
1745
14906
2.5
0.36
125
133
1769
16001
2.3
1311
1280
1647
9773
2.1
0.34
149
147
1625
24818
0.6
0.24
67
80
1640
35736
1.2
0.28
1877
734
47269
3.4
969
674
1652
0.7
0.37
5031
3893
1796
29633
1.1
0.36
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